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A Literature Review on Methodology for 
Measuring and Monitoring Net Impacts of
Employment Benefits and Support Measures
Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on evaluation of government operated programs to
provide temporary income support and to promote reemployment for unemployed job seekers. 
The paper is a synopsis of the international literature spanning various evaluation techniques. 
The main aim is to identify the best methodology for measuring and monitoring net impacts of
Employment Benefits and Support Measures (EBSMs) in Canada.  Sections of the review are
organized around the sources of literature.  The first source is the academic literature, which
provides a theoretical overview of alternative approaches to measuring and monitoring program
impacts.  The issue of  how an ideal net impact monitoring system should work is also explored. 
The next source of literature is Canadian and foreign government reports.  The literature review
provides a context to assess the Canadian experience and future directions.  The Upjohn Institute
team has a high degree of foreign experience on similar topics.  This was an asset in preparing
the literature review since the government and other non-academic literature is typically difficult
to obtain by the normal channels.  
A Literature Review on Methodology for 
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A.  AIMS OF THIS LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper reviews the literature on evaluation of government operated programs to
provide temporary income support and to promote reemployment for unemployed job seekers. 
The paper is a synopsis of the international literature spanning various evaluation techniques. 
The main aim is to identify the best methodology for measuring and monitoring net impacts of
Employment Benefits and Support Measures (EBSMs) in Canada. 
Sections of the review are organized around the sources of literature.  The first source is
the academic literature, which provides a theoretical overview of alternative approaches to
measuring and monitoring program impacts.  The issue of  how an ideal net impact monitoring
system should work is also explored.  The second source of literature is Canadian and foreign
government reports.  
The literature review provides a context to assess the Canadian experience and future
directions.  The Upjohn Institute team has a high degree of foreign experience on similar topics. 
This was an asset in preparing the literature review since the government and other non-academic
literature is typically difficult to obtain by the normal channels.  
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B.  AN OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION METHODS
B.1  Concepts in Evaluation
In considering evaluations of employment programs it is important to be clear about the
distinct concepts which may be examined.  In terms of program outcomes three main types are of
interest: gross outcomes, gross impacts, and net impacts.  A gross outcome is simply mean of an
outcome of interest among program participants.  A gross impact is the difference between
program participants and non-participants on an outcome of interest.  Gross impacts are of little
use in understanding program effectiveness, and can easily misguide program management and
policy decisions.  Net impacts compare mean outcomes of a representative sample of program
participants and an appropriate sample of persons not receiving services.  Great care must be
taken in forming the latter group which is called the comparison group.  Proper net impact
estimation can be done through random assignment in experimental studies, or by using
statistical means to mimic the ideal of an experiment.
To firmly set distinct outcome concepts consider a program intended to improve the
chances of reemployment.  Among program participants and the comparison group we may
examining the rate of reemployment.  Suppose that the rage of reemployment among program
participants is 60 percent, that the observed rate among all previously unemployed is 40 percent
and, that the rate among an appropriately chosen comparison group is 50.  In this example the
program gross outcome is 60 percent, the program gross impact is 20 percent, and the program
net impact is 10 percent.
B.2  Evaluation Techniques
The two most popular evaluation techniques for employment programs are performance
monitoring--usually of gross outcomes, and net impact estimation.  Net impact estimation is
ideally conducted through classically designed field experiments, while it is usually done by a
cheaper and quicker quasi-experimental method which relies on statistical methods to mimic an
experiment.  
B.3  Issues in Performance Monitoring
Performance monitoring of gross program outcomes is usually done as part of a
management system with an annual cycle.  The process to develop and use such a system should:
have nation-wide involvement of all interested parties, involve clear goal setting for each
program monitored, and have agreement on the best performance indicators of reaching goals. 
The system should be simple, involve few performance indicators, have clear and consistent rules
for computation which can easily be done throughout the nation.  While usually gross outcome
measures, performance indicators should be stated in relative terms to facilitate cross region and
cross program comparisons.  The process of creating the system should be inclusive so as to
achieve a consensus and sense of ownership which will promote professionalism and use of the
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system.  The performance indicators system should be viewed as a changeable organic process
which benefits from regular periodic refinement.
A main appeal of performance monitoring is that it provides a basis for a useful
management information system for program operations.  Focus on outcomes also promotes a
culture of cost effectiveness and professionalism among employment service staff.  Usually such
a system involves follow-up surveys so that survey skills are established.  The information
system and survey skills combine to provide and excellent foundation for further evaluation
studies.
Problems can arise in such a system.  In particular where surveys are required response
rates are always uneven across regions.  Furthermore, when high performance is required there is
incentive for data tampering at the local level.  Finally high performance also means that
creaming in program assignment is a distinct possibility.  Resulting is wasted social resources.  
B.4  Issues in Net Impact Estimation
The essential distinction of net impact estimation is that outcomes of program
participants are judged relative to an appropriate comparison group.  For employment programs
this means that those personal characteristics which enable labor market success are roughly the
same in the two groups.  Appropriate comparison group specification can be achieved by proper
sample selection or through statistical means.  That is, either by classical field experiments or by
quasi-experimental statistical methods.  By taking care in estimation the process yields net rather
than gross impacts.  Net impacts are the proper indicator for judging the additional social value
of an employment program.  
B.4.1  Classically Designed Experiments
Classically designed experiments are the ideal for net impact evaluation.  If random
assignment is achieved, modeling of behaviour and complex econometric methods are not
needed to obtain estimates of the net impact of a program.  With large samples randomly
assigned to treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two
groups should not differ on average, so that any difference in outcomes may be attributed to the
program.  Program impact may be measured as the simple difference between the means of the
samples of program participants and of control group members on measures of outcomes.
Because this process is easy to understand, simple unadjusted net impact estimates from field
experiments are usually very influential for the purpose of guiding policy.1
Naturally, field experiments are not without potential problems.  The first type of
problems are called internal validity problems.  These include errors in conducting random
 For examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field experiment, see1
Decker and O’Leary (1995).
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assignment to treatment and control groups, and inconsistent experimental conditions.  The first
problem can lead to lack of homogeneity across groups, the second means that the same
treatment was not applied in all cases.  The second type of pitfall are called external validity
problems.  Time horizon effects can occur when treatment subjects understand that the
experimental service is only temporary rather than permanent.  Learning effects can take place
within a community during the course of an experiment whereby the first enrollees act differently
from those enrolled some time after the experiment begins.  Hawthorne effects are responses to
treatments not due to the content of service, but simply due to the special attention. 
Displacement effects which may be the most critical external validity concern occur when
treatment subjects improve their outcome at the expense of others who are not part of the
experiment.  
B.4.2  Quasi-experimental Econometric Evaluations
When there is non-random assignment to either a program participant group or the
comparison group, then statistical methods of correction must be used to offset the selection bias
in order to properly estimate the net impact of a program.2
Recent surveys of microeconomic evaluations of employment programs conducted by Fay
(1996) for OECD member countries and by Meager and Evans (1998) for a selected group of
countries emphasize the importance of accounting for deadweight loss and displacement effects
when measuring the impact of the program.  With a mixed bag of findings which reveal that the
net impact of different Employment programs varies widely from one population subgroup to
another, the authors of both surveys argued that targeting of services is crucial to maximizing the
social dividend from public expenditure on employment programs.3
It is crucial to account for displacement and substitution effects when assessing the net
social benefits of public programs. However, these factors are irrelevant at the individual level
and very difficult to measure at the social level.  An evaluation design using a comparison group
automatically accounts for possible deadweight loss by comparing employment program
Such methods are called quasi-experimental because they attempt to mimic statistically the ideal of a true2
experiment based on random trials (Fay, 1996).
That is for the following reasons. When an unemployed person participates in an Employment program3
which does not improve his/her chance of re-employment, there is a deadweight loss to society for the expenditure
incurred. If a program manager practises creaming in selecting participants for Employment programs such that the
people supported would have secured employment without the assistance, then a deadweight loss also results. When
an Employment program participant gains re-employment at the direct expense of an otherwise similar job-seeker,
then displacement has occurred. When an employer, either government or private, receives a subsidy to hire a
worker who would otherwise have been hired anyway, then substitution of Employment program financing for other
intended spending has occurred. Johnson and Tomola (1977) provide a clear example of how to estimate the
employment effects of fiscal substitution in direct job creation programs. They maintain that the degree of
substitution increases as a program matures.
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participants with otherwise similar non-participants.  A subgroup analysis of net impact provides
a basis for targeting employment programs.
Quasi-experimental evaluations are often done because they are much cheaper and can be
done more quickly than classical experiments.  They can often be done with existing
administrative data which further reduces evaluation costs.  This is often the case when there is a
“natural experiment,” which is an opportunity presented by a policy change or an economic
event.  The main problems with quasi-experimental net impact evaluations is adequately dealing
with the problem of selection bias.  This is a thorny issue which often requires complex statistical
techniques to properly address.  Such statistical complexity diminishes the policy value of the
findings.  Also, like experiment based net impact evaluations.  The estimates only provide a
snapshot photo at a point in time.  This is distinct from the monitoring approach which gives
consistent information covering a wide geographic area regularly over time.  
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C.  MONITORING GROSS PROGRAM OUTCOMES
C.1  An Overview of Monitoring Gross Program Outcomes
The monitoring of program outcomes is the basis of performance management systems.
In principle such systems can support decentralized decision making in employment policy while
promoting superior performance through positive incentives.  Performance indicators which are
the core of each of these systems are concise measures of program performance that can be easily
computed and tracked on a regular basis.  
To operationalize performance management systems information from the monitoring of
program effectiveness is used by computerized management information systems which combine
data from administrative records with evidence on participant outcomes.  Such evidence may
come from follow-up surveys of program participants and service providers to present an
informative view of program effectiveness.  The performance indicators can become a natural
tool for managers, allowing informed and objective decisions at the local, regional and national
levels. 
To develop good performance indicators the goals of employment programs must be
clearly understood.  Performance indicators should be set to guide operations toward program
goals, but the most important principle governing the development of performance indicators is
that program outcomes rather than process be emphasized. 
The monitoring of program outcomes must not impose an excessive administrative
burden on local and regional employment offices where the first priority must be service to
clients.  The list of performance indicators should be relatively short for any particular program,
and the associated follow-up surveys should ask the minimum possible number of questions.  By
limiting performance measurement to a small number of indicators, any required follow-up
surveys may also remain simple.  This will increase the reliability of data gathered, increase the
response rate, and increase the likelihood that the system will survive over time thereby yielding
valuable information on how programs perform over time.
A basic objective of evaluating employment programs is to compare their relative cost
effectiveness in promoting employment.  They should be constructed so as to measure output per
unit of input.  The ultimate success of any employment program occurs when a program
participant either gains regular employment or avoids unemployment with the assistance
provided.  The average expenditure to achieve this result is the basic measure for comparing cost
effectiveness across programs.  
In an effort to promote an optimal mix of employment programs, performance indicators
can be incorporated directly into the annual planning and budget allocation processes.  The
incentive to achieve a high level of effectiveness will be strengthened if even a small part of the
annual budget allocation depends on measured performance. 
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Since regions within a country vary in their economic strength, before using data on
program performance in deciding budget allocation it is important to account for variations in the
difficulty of finding reemployment.  Consequently, an adjustment methodology for performance
indicators is necessary.  In addition to accounting for regional differences in reemployment
prospects, the adjustment methodology may also provide an easy way to discourage "creaming"
and ensure appropriate targeting of reemployment services.
Creaming refers to the practice of program administrators selecting the most qualified
candidates for program participation so as to increase measured program success.  The analogy is
to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed off.  Creaming is
an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most able people get
reemployment assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it might be
otherwise.  Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of becoming reemployed even
without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified applicants the program
services might be the only realistic path to employment.
An appropriately designed adjustment methodology is an essential component of a
performance management system.  In addition to providing a level playing field for comparison
of inter-regional performance, and a means for discouraging creaming by program managers, an
adjustment methodology can be used to encourage targeting of services to those who have
particular difficulty in gaining reemployment, such as: the long term unemployed, those with low
levels of formal education, and persons with physical handicaps.4
The over-riding goals of employment programs are to achieve reemployment of
unemployed persons, and prevent unemployment for workers at risk of job loss.  Two categories
of performance indicator measure the success in achieving this goal: rate of reemployment, and
cost of reemployment.  A corollary aim of employment programs is to smooth the transition
between jobs.  The main category of performance indicator measuring for this goal is support
cost.  Beyond these general goals, there are a variety of other goals specific to the various
employment programs.  This diversity of goals reflects the impossibility of serving all needs with
a single program.
Another part of the strategy in developing performance indicators is to specify them so
that comparisons across programs are possible.  Certain of the performance indicators across
programs should be similar enough to allow this.  The most comparable measure across programs
falls under the category cost of reemployment.  In the performance indicators, this is usually
based on measurement of employment at follow-up.  Other categories of performance indicators
such as the rate of reemployment, and the support cost, can also allow for comparison across
programs, but the performance indicators formulae for measurement across programs are less
similar due to the differences in program design.
O'Leary (1996) provides a simple example of how to develop and apply an adjustment methodology for4
employment programs.  
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Possible uses of performance indicators in managing employment programs are:
(1)  To preserve decentralized decision making about the allocation of funds to various
programs and service providers.
(2)  To promote superior performance by regions, local offices, and service providers
through positive incentives. 
(3)  To help identify and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or
sanctions.
(4)  To contribute information on performance to the budget allocation process.
(5)  To ensure compliance with legal requirements of programs.
The emphasis among all these uses is on positive incentives rather than punitive action.
C.2  Academic Literature on Monitoring Gross Program Outcomes
Simpson (1990) gave an overview of evaluating gross outcomes of social programs. 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) provide documentation of innumerable cases where performance
indicators are used by state and local governmental units in the United States.   Auer (1996)
documents the use of performance measurement systems for employment programs by countries
in the European Union. The OECD (1994) provided a guide for program managers on how to use
such a system.  Following the lead of countries in Western Europe (Auer, 1996), the Central
European transition economies of Hungary and Poland have adopted performance indicators
systems as a means of monitoring active labor program effects.  O'Leary (1995) provides a
summary of their system.  O'Leary (1993) suggested approaches for avoiding creaming in
program assignment for performance managed employment programs.
In specifying performance indicators for employment programs it is important that the
intermediate goals which result from the performance indicators are consistent with the broad
objectives of securing appropriate regular employment and maintaining adequate income
support.  High performance as measured by the performance indicators should not have
unintended negative side effects.  The issue of incentive compatibility of performance indicators
with larger aims has received quite extensive attention in the research literature; important papers
are: Barnow (1992), Dickinson et al. (1988), and Singer (1986).  Even after considering the
problems of incentive compatibility and creaming, Carolyn Heinrich (1995, p. 66) concludes
that: 
when performance standards are carefully developed to align incentives with
program goals, policymakers should be able to facilitate the kinds of social
program outcomes and impacts they want without having to formulate detailed
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rules and direct management controls to guide program administration and service
delivery. 
C.3  Government Literature on Monitoring Gross Program Outcomes
Performance indicators are a widely accepted method for managing public programs. 
Green and Aaronson (1992) discuss how performance indicators are used in managing training
and education programs in 39 programs which are administered by 7 departments of the United
States federal government. 
In 1993 the federal government of the United States enacted the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA).  So as “to improve the confidence of the American people
in the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies
accountable for achieving program results.”  (U.S. Congress; 1998, p. 32564).  Under the Act all
federal agencies are to operate management systems based on performance measures.  
Extensive systems of performance indicators are also used in the United Kingdom with
some measures of performance being regularly reported in the Employment Gazette.  The U.S.
General Accounting Office (1998) provided a constructive assessment of the performance
management systems used for employment programs in the United States. 
Dickinson et al. (1988) evaluated the effects of performance standards on clients, services
and costs under the Job Training Partnership Act.  West (1992) explains how adjustment
methods for performance standards were developed.  
Following the lead of countries in Western Europe (Auer, 1996), the Central European
transition economies of Hungary and Poland have adopted performance indicators systems as a
means of monitoring active labor program effects.  O’Leary (1996, 1994) in government reports
to Hungary provides a summary of their system.  The first version of this system is given in
O’Leary (1990).  O’Leary and Targowski (1993) in a government report to Poland provides a
summary of their system.  
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D.  LITERATURE ON NET IMPACT ESTIMATION
D.1  An Overview of Net Impact Estimation
Since there is a possibility of selection bias in assigning registered unemployed persons to
active labour programs (ALPs), special care must be taken in evaluating the net impacts of ALPs
on labour market success.  It is useful to have knowledge of  three program impact estimation
methods: (1) simple unadjusted difference in means, (2) difference in means using a matched
pairs comparison group, and (3) regression adjusted impact estimates.  The following provides a
brief description of each of these procedures.  Also given is a concise statement of the subgroup
impact estimation methodology, and some other relevant procedures. 
Unadjusted Impact Estimates
When random assignment has been achieved, modelling of behaviour and complex
econometric methods are not needed to estimate reliable net program impacts.  With large
samples randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable
characteristics of the two groups should not differ on average so that any difference in outcomes
may be attributed to exposure to the program.  Program impacts may be computed as the simple
difference between means of the samples of program participants and control group members on
outcome measures of interest, or:
p c(1) E(y ) - E(y ),
where E is the expectation operator yielding means of the random variables, y is an outcome of
interest, and the index p denotes the sample of program participants while c denotes the
comparison sample.  Tests of significance are done using t-statistics.
In terms of clearly guiding policy, simple unadjusted net impact estimates based on
random trials are usually the most influential because they are easy to understand.  This is the
main appeal of program evaluation done using a classically designed experiment involving
random assignment.   The result of the computation stated in equation (1) is equivalent to the5
slope coefficient estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) applied to a simple bivariate
regression model.  That is, program impacts can be estimated by running the OLS model:
i 0 1 i i(2) y  = a  + a P  + u ,
on a pooled sample of comparison group members and program participants, where y is the
1 0outcome of interest, a  is the impact of the program on the outcome for the ALP participants,  a
is the mean value of the outcome for comparison group members, P is a dummy variable with a
For examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field experiment see Decker5
and O'Leary (1995).  
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ivalue of 1 for active labour program (ALP) participants and 0 otherwise, u  is a normally
distributed mean zero error term, and I is an index denoting individuals in either the participant
or comparison group samples.  Tests for significance of program impacts are simply t-tests on the
1parameter a .
Impact Estimates Using a Matched Pairs Comparison Group
When participant group and comparison group members differ significantly in terms of
observable characteristics, it would not be surprising to observe different labour market success
across program participant and comparison groups even in the absence of ALPs.  To put the
assessment of ALPs on an even footing, a separate comparison group for each sample of ALP
participants may be formed using a matched pairs methodology.6
If it is representative of the universe of unemployed, the sampling frame for the
comparison group can be randomly selected from the unemployment register.  Matched pairs
comparison groups can then be formed by comparing persons in the ALP participant samples
with those in the full comparison group using the standardized Mahalanobis distance measure:
pc k pk ck(3) d  = Sum (Z  - Z )
2
where, the index p represents observations in an ALP participant sample and the index c
represents observations from the comparison group, the index k runs over the n exogenous
characteristics on which the observations are matched, and Z represents the standardized value of
a characteristic where the mean and standard deviation of the characteristic is computed on the
pooled sample of the comparison group sampling frame and the participants in the relevant ALP.
Using this distance measure, separate matched pairs comparison groups were selected for
pceach ALP.  The person with the smallest d  from the full comparison group sampling frame was
selected for inclusion in the matched pairs comparison group, with ties being resolved randomly
and each person in the ALP sample being compared to all those in the full comparison group
sampling frame.7
After forming the matched pairs comparison groups, program impact estimates were
computed using a simple difference of means, with significance of impacts being judged by t-
tests.  It should be noted that because a single observation from the comparison sample may be
chosen more than once for the synthetic comparison group, the estimated standard error,
computed in the usual way, for this group will be reduced.  Therefore standard t-tests based on
See Fraker and Maynard (1987) for an interesting review and application of comparison group designs for6
evaluating employment-related programs.
That is, sampling was done with replacement.  7
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matched pairs data depend on lower bound standard error estimates which give the upper bound
on the possible statistical significance.
Regression Adjusted Impact Estimates
 Multivariate regression analysis is a natural method for assessing the net impact of
program participation on labour market success when observable characteristics of participant
and comparison group members are dramatically different.  This method involves a simple
extension of equation (2).  In such cases, estimation of the model:
i 0 1 i 1 1i 2 2i n ni i(4) y  = a  + a P  + b X  + b X  + ...+ b X  + u ,
by OLS on the pooled sample yields net program impact estimates.   In equation (4) y is the8
0outcome of interest, a  is the mean value of the outcome for comparison group members
evaluated at the mean of all observable characteristics included in the regression, P is a dummy
1variable with a value of 1 for program participation and 0 otherwise, a  is the impact of the
program on the outcome for the program participants evaluated at the mean of all observable
1 ncharacteristics, X  to X  are observable characteristics measured as deviations from their mean
ivalues, u  is a normally distributed mean zero error term, and I is an index denoting individuals in
either the participant or comparison group samples.9
This method yields net program impacts adjusted for observable characteristics.   The10
estimates are called net because the comparison and program participant groups are statistically
adjusted so as to remove heterogeneity across the samples.  That is, the only remaining factor
contributing to a difference in the outcome measure is exposure to the program treatment.  The
estimation methodology nets out all other observable factors affecting the outcome.
In this report, since the main dependent variable of interest--in a normal job--is binary, the regression8
model predicts the probability of reemployment.  The OLS estimation is a linear probability model, which may yield
biased estimates.  OLS estimates may be biased since the range of variation in the dependent variable is constrained
to the zero-one interval.  Maddala (1982, Chapter 1) suggests using the logit estimator in such cases.  Bias is usually
most severe when the bulk of probability clusters at one or other extreme of the zero-one interval  Since
reemployment probabilities for the ALP and comparison groups generally range from about 40 to 60 percent, the
limited range of the dependent variable is not a likely source of severe bias in estimating parameters by OLS.  
1In this application the regression model is a statement of an analysis of covariance methodology, where X
9
nto X  are the covariates.  Mohr (1992, pp. 83-87) discusses extending a regression model for program impacts to
include control variables.   
The obvious next procedure to adjust for differences across samples is to account for differences in10
unobservable characteristics.  The technique, which involves applying the methods of Heckman (1976), is
problematic because instruments are usually not available to explain program participation independent of
reemployment success.  
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Full Interaction Regression Adjusted Impact Estimates
A more general regression model for impact estimation which allows for variation in
program effects by observable characteristics during estimation is called a full interaction
regression model.  Such a model is a direct generalization of equation (4).  The model may be
written:
i 0 1 i 1 1i 2 2i n ni 1 i 1i 2 i 2i n i ni i(5) y  = a  + a P  + b X  + b X  + ...+ b X   + c P X  + c P X  + ...+ c P X  + u ,
and can be estimated by OLS on the pooled sample to give net program impact estimates.  In
equation (5) the variables are the same as those defined for equation (4).  However, for this
1 k k kgeneralized regression model the net program impact is computed as a  + sum (c E(X )), where
k kE(X ) denotes the mean of characteristic X .  Tests of confidence on these linear combinations of
estimates may easily be performed as F-tests.
Subgroup Net Impact Estimation Methodology
For each separate ALP, subgroup treatment impacts were simultaneously estimated in a
single regression model.  The specification employed allows the treatment response for each
subgroup to be estimated controlling for the influence of other subgroup characteristics.  For
example, the model allows estimation of treatment impacts associated with being female
controlling for the fact that females are more likely to have more formal education and less likely
to work in a blue collar occupation.  
Suppressing subscripts and using matrix notation, the regression equation used to
estimate subgroup net impact estimates can be written:
(6) Y = a + PB + GC + GPD' + u
where Y is the outcome measure, a is the intercept, B, C, and D, are conformable parameter
vectors, P is the indicator of participation in an ALP, G is the matrix of dummy variables which
code for membership in a subgroup, and u is a mean zero normally distributed random error
term.  Equation (6) specifies a complete one-way interaction model.  It allows simultaneous
estimation of all subgroup treatment impacts, but imposes linear restrictions on the estimates. 
Treatment impacts for a particular subgroup are computed as the sum of the parameter estimate
on the product of the subgroup dummy variable and the treatment indicator plus the sum of
parameter estimates on the product of subgroup dummy variables and the treatment indicator
multiplied by their respective population shares.  In each computation, parameter estimates for
the complement to the subgroup of interest are omitted.
The subgroup impact estimates may be considered to be regression adjusted in the sense
that each subgroup impact is estimated while simultaneously allowing impacts to vary across
other subgroups considered. 
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Methodology for Estimation of Program Components
To estimate the impact of separate features of an ALP on outcomes of interest, new
iprogram variables are defined from the single program variable P  such that the vectors for the
inew variables add up to the vector for the old variable.  For example, if P  has a value of 1 if
participated in an ALP and 0 otherwise, to examine the separate impacts of the ALP operated by
1ipublic and private enterprises on outcomes of interest we may define P  = 1 if participated in an
2iALP operated by a public enterprise and 0 otherwise, and  P  = 1 if participated in an ALP
i 1i 2ioperated by a private enterprise and 0 otherwise.  Therefore P  = P   + P  , and the separate
impacts of the ALP run by public and private enterprises on outcomes of interest can be
estimated by OLS regression applied to a simple model like:
i 0 1 1i 2 2i i(7) y  = b  + b P  + b P  + u .
1From this model the parameter estimate for b  is the impact of wage subsidy run by public
2enterprise on outcome of interest, while b  is the impact of wage subsidy run by private
enterprise.  The model of equation (7) can be applied to other partitions of the program
experience, such as short and long duration participation, or to partitions which are more than
two way, such as three industry groups for program operators. 
Notice, that in this case the full set of indicator variables is included in the equation for
OLS estimation.  For this procedure the full set of program treatment indicators does not
introduce singularity in estimation, because the program vectors include data on both program
participants and comparison group members.   Equation (7) also presumes that the participant
and comparison groups are homogenous in observable characteristics.  If this is not the case,
control variables should be added to the specification as was shown in equation (4).
Method for Separating out Impacts of Multiple Programs
It is very possible that an individual may have participated in more than one ALP.  In
particular, it is a frequent occurrence that a participant in an ALP such as retraining or public
service employment will also use the services of the employment service (ES) in an effort to gain
reemployment.  To estimate the impact of a single program when some in a sample being
analyzed have used more than one program, a simple regression model may be used.  Suppose
that someone uses both an ALP and the ES, then a model like the following might be estimated:
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i i 1 i i(8) y  = a  + b ALP  + b ES  + b ALP  *ES   + c X   + u ,
where ALP represents participation in an ALP, ES represents use of an ES service, X represents
exogenous control variables, y is the outcome of interest, and u is a normally distributed mean
zero error term.  After estimating an equation of this form by OLS, the marginal effect of the
1 3ALP on y is estimated by the sum of b  + b  *E(ES), where E is the expectation operator and
E(ES) is the mean of the variable ES or the proportion of the sample which used the ES. 
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2 3Similarly the marginal effect of the ES on y is estimated by the sum of b  + b  *E(ALP).  ests of
confidence on these sums of estimates may easily be performed as F-tests.
Methods for Analysis of the Timing of Response
To examine the impact of ALP participation on the time pattern of reemployment,
conditional exit rates are examined for each month.  The exit rate is computed by dividing the
number of registered unemployed who left the register for reemployment in a given month by the
number of claimants in the group at the start of that month.  Letting h(t) denote the conditional
texit rate in month t, and R  the number of registered unemployed at the start of month t, then 
t t+1 t(9) h(t) = (R  - R )/R , 
is a conditional measure of a change in behaviour because it depends on the number who had yet
tto change their behaviour regarding the outcome at the start of each month (R ).  The expression
h(t) is the popular Kaplan-Meier exit rate discussed thoroughly by Kiefer (1988).  The number of
tregistered unemployed at the start of each time period (R ) is called the "risk set" because it is the
number of job seekers "at risk" of changing behaviour in the subsequent month.  Note that risk
set in month t+1 equals the risk set in the previous month times one minus the exit rate for that
t+1 tmonth [R  = R  (1 - h(t))]. 
Sample Size Requirements for Power Tests of ALP Effects
Testing the difference between proportions is somewhat complicated by the fact that the
sample sizes required for properly testing a given difference between proportions varies
depending on whether the proportions are near zero or one (Cohen 1988, chapter 6).  
Specifically, the required sample sizes for testing the difference in proportions with adequate
power depend on the effect size, h, which is the difference in the arcsin transformation of the
p cproportions.  That is, f(p) = 2arcsin/p and the effect size is h = f(p ) - f(p )  for non-directional
p ctests where p is the proportion employed among the ALP participant group and p  is the
p c pproportion employed among the comparison group.  For tests of (p  - p ) = 0.05 when p  is
around 0.5 then h = 0.1.  To perform two tailed tests at the confidence level of 98 percent with a
power of 80 percent and h = 0.1 the harmonic mean of the sample sizes should be at least 2,007
p c p cin size, where the harmonic mean, n', of the samples sizes is n' = 2n n /(n  + n ).  Lowering the
pconfidence level to 90 percent lowers the sample size requirement to 1,237.  When p  is closer to
p ceither 0 or 1 the sample size requirements for similar tests [(p  - p ) = 0.05] are smaller.
D.2 Academic Literature on Net Impact Estimation
Net impact evaluation of government employment and training programs dates at least to
Borus (1964) who evaluated impacts on employment and earnings of Manpower Demonstration
and Training Act (MDTA) participants in the U.S.  Heckman (1976) did papers identifying the
effect of sample selection in program participation and exploring easy ways to correct for the
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problem.  Maddala (1986, pp. 260-267) summarized the essential methods developed by
Heckman.  An important treatment of sample selection bias was done by Ashenfelter (1978) who
identified what has come to be known as the "Ashenfelter dip" in earnings prior to program
participation.   Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and others confirmed the existence of the
phenomenon.  The finding was identified more generally for displaced workers by Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). 
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973 was the first training
program for which the U.S. Department of Labour developed a data base specifically intended
for program evaluation (Leigh 1990, p. 10).  It was called the Continuous Longitudinal
Manpower Survey (CLMS) and contained data on program participants, data on comparison
group members drawn from the national labour force survey (Current Population Survey), and
earnings data for all subjects from national social insurance (Social Security) records.   Despite
the fact that CETA programs were targeted to low-income individuals while the labour force
survey represented the nation, evaluation studies were greatly facilitated.  Three main findings
emerged from 11 major CETA evaluations (Leigh 1990, p. 11).  First, there were no measurable
employment or earnings impacts for men, however impacts for women were positive and
significant.  Second, on-the-job training is usually more effective than classroom training. 
Finally, the range of impact estimates was quite wide, despite the fact that all analysts used the
same CMLS data.  However, it was journalists rather than economists who brought the end to
CETA.  The pubic service employment (PSE) component of CETA became a national target for
criticism when careless management of funds and enrollment of program ineligibles were widely
reported.  The associated problem of "fiscal substitution" where by local government agencies
replaced regular staff with CETA PSE workers in order to conserve local tax payer money was
estimated by Johnson and Tomola (1977) to increase with the maturity of the program.  Problems
in CETA PSE increased dramatically after funding for PSE was greatly expanded in 1977 as part
of an expansionary federal fiscal policy.  The CETA program ended without remorse in 1982 at
its scheduled expiration date (Leigh 1990, p. 7).  Even though states gained a role in
administration of CETA vis-a-vis MDTA, in the end no states were advocates for continued
authorization of CETA.  By then, CETA had become a four letter word.  
 Johnson and Stromsdorfer (1990) summarize strategies for net impact evaluation of Job
Training Partnership (JTPA) programs in the U.S.  The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of
1982 was the result of true ideological and partisan compromise.  The bill was jointly sponsored
by the liberal Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and the conservative Republican Senator
Daniel Quayle.  Many features of the bill reflected the compromise.  Evaluation was an integral
part of the program which was said to be performance driven through a system of performance
standards for participant reemployment rates and earnings.  Also of note was the absence of
anything remotely resembling PSE.  The performance standards system allowed governors
receiving federal JTPA training grants to structure incentive systems, and there by objectify the
relationship to substate areas.  Ostensibly removing politics from the funding process.  Governors
reserved some allocations for incentive rewards paid to areas achieving high levels of
performance.  The performance monitoring system changed training program management and
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intergovernmental relations.  It also complicated the net impact evaluation of programs by
introducing the risk of creaming in program assignment.   That is, program managers might11
select mainly the most able applicants for participation.  The result is high observed
reemployment rates, however many of the selected program participants may already possess the
skills and abilities to get reemployed themselves.  By comparing their success to all unemployed,
the positive impact on reemployment is high, but comparing their success to others with similar
characteristics the program impacts may be much smaller.   To assure an objective net impact12
evaluation, Congress authorized a major national evaluation of JTPA based on methods of field
experimentation with random assignment of subjects both to training and to comparison groups
in 16 sites across the country.  Orr et al. (1995, p. 109) report that training to economically
disadvantaged adults resulted in 11 percent greater earnings for women and 6.7 percent greater
earnings for men.  For both genders the earnings gains were mainly due to increases in hours
worked.  There were positive net benefits to both men and women and the net benefit to society
for both genders was just over $500 per participant (Orr et al.; 1995, p. 189).  
For unemployment insurance (UI) in the U.S., since the work of Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
(1976) it has been generally accepted that UI lengthens spells of insured unemployment beyond
what they would be otherwise.  Decker (1997) documented the range of estimates UI has on
reemployment.  He reported that a 10 percent increase in the rate at which UI benefits replace
prior wages increases the duration of unemployment by between 0.5 and 1.5 weeks, and a 1 week
increase in the potential duration of benefits increases unemployment duration by between 0.1
and 0.5 weeks.  While these negative impact estimates are non-disputable, it is also possible that
prolonged job search improves the quality of job matches which ultimately boosts worker
productivity.  
D.3  Government Literature on Net Impact Estimation
Since evaluations of unemployment compensation and retraining programs have usually
been done under government contract most work in the academic literature has it's origins in
government reports.  Concerning unemployment insurance (UI) in the U.S., we are fortunate that
the wisdom of Steve Wandner created the UI Occasional Paper series with in the U.S.
Department of Labor.  This series contains a wealth of knowledge and details about how to do
evaluation of passive income support.  Most U.S. evaluations of training programs remain largely
unpublished technical reports from research institutes, universities and consulting firms. 
The analogy is to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed off. 11
Creaming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most able people get reemployment
assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it might be otherwise.  Highly qualified
program entrants have a good chance of becoming reemployed even without the services offered in the program,
while for less qualified applicants the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.  
An evaluation of retraining in Hungary found evidence of creaming in referral to services  (O’Leary,12
1997).  
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E.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR MONITORING NET IMPACTS OF EBSMs
E.1  Conceptualizing the Problem
Efforts within HRDC to develop a high performance driven system for EBSMs based on
continuous measurement of net/incremental impacts on outcomes is at the forefront of
international practice for modern public management of government employment promotion
programs.  It is well known that when program managers are encouraged to achieve a high
employment rate for program participants in a gross outcome based monitoring system, a
phenomenon called cream skimming frequently results.   That is, program managers might select13
mainly the most able applicants for participation.  The result is high observed reemployment
rates, however many of the selected program participants may already possess the skills and
abilities to get reemployed themselves.  By comparing gross outcomes of participants to
outcomes for all unemployed, the positive impact on reemployment is high, but comparing
participant success to others with similar characteristics the program impacts may be much
smaller.   14
Since they are widely recorded on a continuous basis, the performance indicators results
are useful for ongoing program management and planning.  However, these indicators cannot
inform policy makers about any added value which may be provided by programs.  For such net
impact analyses a comparison group design is needed.  Net impact evaluations help policy
makers decide which programs to expand, modify or delete as economic and political conditions
change.  If such evaluations were available on an ongoing basis they may serve as useful
management tools supplanting gross outcome monitoring and removing several of the associated
problems.  
In terms of clearly guiding policy, simple unadjusted impact estimates are usually the
most influential because they are easy to understand.  This is the main appeal of program
evaluation done using a classically designed experiment involving random assignment.   When15
random assignment has been achieved, modeling of behavior and complex econometric methods
are not needed to estimate reliable net program impacts.  With large samples randomly assigned
to treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups
should not differ on average so that any difference in outcomes may be attributed to exposure to
The analogy is to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed off.  Cream13
skimming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most able people get reemployment
assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it might be otherwise.  Highly qualified
program entrants have a good chance of becoming reemployed even without the services offered in the program,
while for less qualified applicants the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.  
An evaluation of retraining in Hungary found evidence of creaming in referral to services  (O’Leary,14
1997).  
For examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field experiment see Decker15
and O'Leary (1995).  
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the program.  Program impacts may be computed as the simple difference between means of the
samples of program participants and control group members on outcome measures of interest. 
When there is non-random assignment to either the program participant group or the
comparison group from the population of unemployed job seekers then statistical methods of
correction must be used to reveal the net impacts of programs.   That is, proper estimation of16
program net impacts involves correcting for possible selection bias which is present if persons
entering programs are on average different from comparison group members in their job skills
and aptitude.
When an unemployed person participates in an program which does not improve their
chance of reemployment there is a deadweight loss to society for the spending.   When a17
program participant gains reemployment at the direct expense of an otherwise similar
unemployed job seeker then displacement has occurred.  When an employer, either government
or private, receives a subsidy to hire a worker who would have otherwise been hired anyway then
substitution of program financing for other intended spending has occurred.   It is important to18
consider displacement and substitution effects when doing social benefit-cost assessments of
public programs. 
Rehabilitating performance monitoring by adopting a system for the ongoing review of
short and medium term net/incremental program effects, is an exciting innovation.  It offers the
prospect of an elegant alternative to the cumbersome system where by performance targets are
relaxed by increased service to specially designated hard to reemploy groups.   However, new19
incentive questions are raised by the net/incremental approach.  Also, questions about
harmonizing the management decision cycle with medium-term outcome measures should be
confronted.  This includes consideration of budget allocation models based on performance.  The
Upjohn Institute team will work with all the interested parties in HRDC including representatives
from SE&M, EDD, HRIB to review the previous benchmarking work on net/incremental
medium-term measures, and to identify appropriate and practical ways to incorporate
net/incremental outcome monitoring into a modern performance driven management system for
HRDC.  To ensure usefulness of the proposed system, we also plan to consult representatives
from NHQ, Regional Head Quarters (RHQs), and HRCCs.
Such methods are sometimes called quasi-experimental because they attempt to statistically mimic the16
ideal of a true experiment based on random trials (Fay, 1996).  
If a program manager practices creaming in selecting participants for programs, then a deadweight loss17
results.  
Johnson and Tomola (1977) provide a clear example of how to estimate the employment effects of fiscal18
substitution in direct job creation programs.  They maintain that the degree of substitution increases as a program
matures.  
Such adjustment methodologies are discussed by O'Leary (1995, 1996).19
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E.2  Strategies for Drawing Comparison Samples
Key to developing an on going net impact evaluation system for EBSMs in Canada is the
issue of how to draw comparison groups.  The better job of drawing appropriate comparison
groups, the less statistical adjustment will be required to produce reliable net impact estimates of
program effects.  Issues of relevance include defining the sample frame.  This will require a
thorough understanding of available data systems and their possible automated interrelationships. 
E.3  Issues of Data Completeness and Accuracy
As part of this project it will be crucial to sample data sets from all the systems
contemplated for use in the on going net impact evaluation system.  The data must be checked for
completeness and accuracy.  Alternative data sources should be identified where irreparable
problems are found.  One alternative is follow-up surveys.  This is possible, but not desireable. 
The hope is to define a system around short and medium term measures of appropriate program
outcomes based entirely on administrative data which is used in employment offices nationwide.
E.4  Practical Implementation
All design considerations will be done with an eye toward practical implementation of the
systems developed.  This means partnering with national, regional, and local employment policy
practitioners at every stage of the project.
E.5  Uses for Management and Policy Formulation
There is much experience with use of gross outcome monitoring data for program
management and planning.  The incentive structures and pitfalls are reasonably well understood. 
Similarly, net impact assessment has been used for policy formulation with great success. 
Heckman (1996, p. 2) has noted that: “Performance goals are usually set in terms of
levels attained by participants at some point in time.  Yet a more meaningful measure of program
performance is value-added or gain, which is much harder to measure, but which is the true
output of a program.”
It is not known what problems may arise if performance management systems are based
on net impact estimates.  How will a program manager be expected to use such information to
improve the social value of services provided?  Furthermore, what are the different uses of short
term and medium-term performance measures for program management.  In addition to solving
technical details of data organization and computation, this project must take great care to
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